The Polity and Society

www.tpas.lexarcheus.com
Vol.-04, No.-01 (Jan-Jun, 2026)

ISSN: 2584-0770
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Geopolitical Challenges to India's Energy Security amid the Israel-Iran War and the Hormuz Crisis

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ARTICLE INFO

Article History

Received	18-01-2026
Revised	26-04-2026
Accepted	18-05-2026
Published	30-06-2026

ARTICLE ID

TPAS0401003

KEYWORDS

Energy Security, Israel Iran War, Strait of Hormuz, Geopolitics.

ABSTRACT

The Israel Iran War and the Strait of Hormuz crisis have emerged as major geopolitical developments with significant implications for global energy security and international trade. Nearly one fifth of the world's oil consumption and about one fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most strategic maritime chokepoints. This paper examines the geopolitical implications of the Israel-Iran conflict and the Strait of Hormuz crisis, analyzing their impact on global energy markets and India's energy security. The paper discusses the strategic importance of the Hormuz chokepoint, through which approximately one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas trade passes, and discusses how regional instability has heightened supply chain vulnerabilities, increased transportation costs, and driven crude oil price volatility. The study emphasizes India's significant dependence on Gulf region imports and the vulnerabilities arising from reliance on a critical maritime route. It explores India's diplomatic, strategic, and economic responses, including diversifying energy sources, expanding strategic petroleum reserves, strengthening regional partnerships, and accelerating renewable energy deployment. The paper concludes that sustained diplomatic engagement, supply diversification, and investment in clean energy are essential for enhancing India's long-term energy resilience amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

How to Cite This Article

Heer Singh Rajput, "Geopolitical Challenges to India's Energy Security amid the Israel-Iran War and the Hormuz Crisis," *The Polity and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2026, pp. 25–35.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21354987

The Polity and Society
ISSN: 2584-0770
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INTRODUCTION

The Israel–Iran War has become a serious war in the security environment of West Asia, where military and proxy wars may lead to any disruption in the flow of essential shipping channels (Liu, 2025). In this regard, the most important channel is the Strait of Hormuz, which has a width of less than 21 nautical miles but serves 20-21 million barrels of oil daily during 2022, which constitutes about 21-25 percent of international oil trade and approximately one-fifth of global oil liquids consumption. Oil flows through the strait in the first quarter of 2025 have been estimated at approximately 20.1 million barrels per day, which makes up about 27 percent of the global volume of oil shipments via sea routes and highlights the importance of Hormuz as one of the vital energy bottlenecks in the world (Kaya, 2026). Given the fact that about one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade also moves through Hormuz, any disruption will have serious effects on energy prices and maritime security. The issues pose a significant risk to India. For example, in the past few years, roughly 80-85% of the Indian import requirements for crude oil have come from the countries of the Persian Gulf region like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait (Saraswat, 2025). A large volume of Indian crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz on their way to Asia. It is expected that in 2022, 82% of crude and condensates transited through Hormuz will be destined for Asia, with India being a major recipient, receiving roughly 1.6 to 2.1 million barrels per day through this route in early 2025. Such high dependency makes India susceptible to supply chain disruptions, increasing shipping costs, and fluctuations in energy prices due to geopolitical tensions in West Asia (Aggarwal, 2026).

Though there are considerable literature and analysis that discusses the strategic significance of Hormuz and the wider West Asian theater, it does not adequately explore the link between the Israel-Iran war and the Hormuz crisis in relation to the behavior of the international energy markets and maritime security concerns, alongside identifying and measuring India's own vulnerabilities in light of crude oil imports. Earlier studies have considered these three dimensions of geopolitics, chokepoints, and energy policy separately, based on global figures instead of the disaggregated impact of incidents at the Hormuz chokepoint on India's energy security variables over time. The analysis that has a strong geopolitical foundation, as well as being based on ample amount of data, becomes necessary to comprehend the process of how regional wars change the energy trade dynamics globally and also to determine the Indian strategy to protect its energy interests. Thus, this paper attempts to look into the geopolitical significance of the Israel-Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz situation for the global energy market and maritime security, their effects on Indian energy security particularly the oil imports, and Indian strategies.

Geopolitical Implications of the Israel Iran War and the Hormuz Crisis

The Middle East is a reliable supplier of India's energy needs, given its geographical proximity and historical connection. In present times, India is importing 40% crude oil and 60% the natural gas from the region. However, the ongoing crises around the Strait of Hormuz highlight the depth of this dependence and vulnerabilities inherent in such concentrated exposure (Bajpaee, 2025). India has been able to diversify its crude oil sourcing from almost 40 countries and has modest crude oil and refined products stocks in pipelines, above ground tanks in its distribution network and offshore vessels of around 50 days.

Figure 1 Strategic Implications of the Hormuz Crisis



Source: *Author*

The gas markets are much more tightly closed, however. Almost 90% of Liquefied Petroleum Gas imports and Natural Gas Liquids imports come from the Middle East, besides significant imports of natural gas. When there is a shortage of supplies, energy prices always raise, that's the double whammy. High prices of energy affect the depreciation of the currency, along with the growing current account deficit and sluggish capital inflows, raise the likelihood of a "stagflation." If oil prices continue to show further upward trend towards USD 100 per barrel, India's current account deficit may push towards 3% of GDP in the coming years as compared to 1.5% of GDP in the baseline. Energy security, thus, is not just supply-related but also a national and economic security (Khurana, 2025). The Strait of Hormuz crisis and the Israel–Iran war have not only made the region unstable, but have also created real impact on the world energy market and maritime security structures. By early 2026, the oil and LNG tanker traffic had been cut to an average of 53 per day in 2025/26, down to, in March 2026, as low as 2 per day, due to Iran's coercive closure and de facto "soft blockade" of Hormuz. It is estimated that 16-18 million barrels per day of crude and petroleum liquids, 80% of pre-crisis throughput of the Hormuz, have been temporarily diverted from seaborne trade, the World Bank describes it as the biggest disruption of the oil market in history. Global oil supply declined 10.1 million bpd in March and is expected to decline 6.9 million barrels per day year on year, in 2026Q2, which represents a 6.6% contraction, only matched by the COVID-19 shock (Shah et al., 2026).

This is an extraordinary shock that has been captured in price dynamics. Dubai crude reportedly jumped to around 170 dollars per barrel during the height of the closure, at the same time, the spread between the two grades was trading at an eight-figure level, the Brent Dubai spread was nearing 85 dollars, and scenario analysis performed by market analysts and US officials were considering the possibility of prices climbing to 200 dollars per barrel in worst case prolonged blockade scenarios. The contended range is between 95 and 115 dollars per barrel, with a baseline estimate of 86 dollars per barrel, reflecting a potential 10-35% premium over baseline due to conflict-driven disruption. Even with emergency releases of stocks, projected oil demand growth for 2026Q2 is about 3.7 million bpd short of supply, despite the U.S. efforts to cover Middle East supply shortages largely through incremental increases in non-OPEC+ supply growth. But parallel modelling of gas flows shows a significant reduction in LNG volumes, as tanker traffic to and from gas faded to almost zero during the peak closure period, creating a severe strain on global gas markets and putting downstream power and gas consumers at risk. In response, maritime security has been re-orientated. The continued acts of illegal boarding, detention and seizure in Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman resulted in special watch and warning maritime advisory by the United States, and greater naval presence, convoy escort and joint naval monitoring of maritime domain awareness across multiple navies. The crisis has made it necessary to either cancel or reroute shipping services, and alternative pipelines or non-Hormuz routes are only covering about 30-40% of the lost capacity, demonstrating the lack of redundancy in the sea-borne energy transportation infrastructure. The region has become a premier war risk area with insurers raising premiums and adding extra costs to import-dependent economies (Tantray, 2026). In terms of strategy, the crisis is hastening a longer-term shift in the energy and security picture. fossil fuels continue to account for around 80% of global energy demand, analysts report that states are increasingly investing in renewable and electrification to create "security super levers," especially after the Iran-Hormuz shock, with renewable making up some 85% of the year-on-year increase in power capacity additions in the 12 months prior to the conflict. Like Europe's post Ukraine structural demand shift and diversification, major Asian importers are facing a similar challenge, albeit with greater technological choice in solar, wind, storage and electric vehicles. In this respect, the Israel-Iran war and the Hormuz crisis have combined the old geopolitics with the new energy and maritime security landscape, and shown how fragile and vulnerable chokepoint dependent systems can be, as well as the nature of a more diversified, electrified and security conscious global energy future (Bhattarai, 2026).

The Polity and Society
ISSN: 2584-0770
Vol : 04 , No. 01 (Jan-Jun, 2026)
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Table 1 Statistics on the Strait of Hormuz Crisis and Global Oil Market Volatility

Indicator	Unit	Value
Oil removed from global trade during the Hormuz closure	Million barrels per day	16 to 18
Pre-crisis Hormuz oil transit disrupted	Percent	80 to 90
Global oil supply decline (March 2026)	Million barrels per day	10.1
Projected global oil supply decline (Q2 2026)	Million barrels per day	6.9
Projected global oil supply decline (Q2 2026)	Percent	6.6
Average oil and LNG tanker transits before the crisis	Tankers per day	53.2
Oil and LNG tanker transits during the peak closure	Tankers per day	2
Estimated global oil market deficit (Q2 2026)	Million barrels per day	3.7
Peak Dubai crude oil price during the crisis	USD per barrel	170
Baseline Brent crude price projection (2026)	USD per barrel	86
Stress-test Brent crude price range (2026)	USD per barrel	95 to 115
Worst-case Brent crude price scenario	USD per barrel	200
Hormuz export capacity replaced through alternative routes	Percent	30 to 40
Global energy demand met by fossil fuels	Percent	80
Share of new global electricity generation capacity from renewables	Percent	85

Source: *Compiled by the author from World Bank (2026), International Energy Agency (2026), U.S. Energy Information Administration (2026), and International Energy Forum (2026).*

The Hormuz Crisis and India's Energy Security

The Hormuz crisis has had a direct, measurable impact on India's energy security across three linked dimensions: crude import volumes and composition, supply chain vulnerabilities, and domestic exposure to energy price volatility. The Israel-Iran war that started on 28th February 2026 has greatly affected the energy supply routes in West Asia, posing a major challenge to India's energy security (Chachda, 2026). The conflict is significant for India as it imports almost 91 % of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) from the Gulf region. Indian domestic prices of LPG were soon upped by Rs 60 per cylinder and the price of Brent crude oil surged past $120 per barrel within a period of days of the outbreak of the war, the Strait of Hormuz, which serves as the gateway for a significant amount of Indian LPG imports, was shut to commercial shipping. The Government of India had to invoke the Essential Commodities Act to ensure that there is no major disruption in supply, and domestic refinery production is shifted to meet the domestic demand for LPG for household use.

India is the second largest importer of LPG. Domestic refineries account for some 40% of the country's LPG requirements, the balance being imported, and the main source of supply is the Gulf region. The government's efforts to promote the use of LPG have contributed to India's reliance on imported LPG, which has been a steady trend over the last 10 years. The number of active domestic LPG consumers rose from over 148.6 million consumers in 2015 to over 330.5 million consumers in July 2025, a growth of more than 120%. This shift was also greatly hastened by the introduction of the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana in 2016. When the LPG program was started, the coverage of LPG households was 62%, and now it is close to 100%. With the increased adoption of LPG in households, LPG imports also rose from 16.48 MMT in 2020-21 to over 18 MMT in 2025-26. Most of India's LPG imports are from few countries in the West Asia. The volume of LPG imports from Qatar grew and

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became the highest share from India in 2025, about 34%. Almost 26% came from the United Arab Emirates and 8.3% from Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was once a significant supplier to India but in 2020 it contributed around 11% of the country's imports. The LPG is mostly exported from these countries via the Strait of Hormuz, which is an important shipping route between Iran and Oman. One-fifth of the world's daily trade in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through this slender waterway. With its closure on 1st March 2026, its impact on India's energy imports has been direct and the dependence of India on a single strategic shipping route has also been thrown into sharp relief (Anonymous, 2026).

Figure 2 Major Impacts of the Hormuz Crisis on India's Energy Security



Source: *Author*

The war has also caused the disruption of imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) into India. In the current period (2024-25), India imported a record 27 MMT of LNG, with about half of this coming from Qatar. LNG is one of the major raw materials used in the manufacturing of fertilizers, electricity generation and in city gas distribution network. The disruption of LNG supplies will consequently also impact agricultural production, electricity production and electricity security in city areas, all of which will drive up production costs for a range of economic sectors. As a result of the shortage of supply, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas issued an order to all oil refining companies in the country on 9th March to maximize LPG recovery and allocate all LPG production to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL). Refiners were not allowed to take propane and butane streams for petrochemical production. The measures led to an increase in domestic LPG production in the first week of about 10% which helped to partially compensate for the interruption of imports (Chowdhary & Usmani, 2026). It has impacted multiple sectors of the Indian economy

due to the disruption in LPG supplies. There was an instant shortage in the hospitality segment as hotel associations in Bengaluru reported that only about 10% of hotel establishments had LPG supplies on March 10. Refills for the commercial consumers in Mumbai were delayed for two to eight days. The National Restaurant Association of India estimates that almost 75% of the food service sector in the country is dependent on LPG and a continuation of the disruption could lead to economic losses of Rs 1,200 crore to Rs 1,300 crore every day. The crisis had a broad social and economic effect, with restrictions on supplies of funeral services occurring at hospitals, educational facilities and LPG crematoriums in several cities (Patel, 2026).

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz in late February 2026 has seen India's crude imports decline both in terms of quantity and percentage share of the Gulf. During the course of some two-and-a-half months of the crisis, the average amount of crude imported fell to about 4.5 mbd from nearly 5 mbd prior to the crisis, or roughly 10% of daily imports. India's crude imports in March 2026 were 23% lower than in February, imports in the first 18 days of March have dropped from 105 million barrels during the previous month's first 18 days to 81 million barrels. In the general decrease, supplies from the Middle East fell by the most from 59.9 million barrels to 22.4 million barrels, as imports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE dipped in early March to 7.9 million, 6.8 million and 1.9 million barrels, respectively. The region experienced a momentous shift in India's crude basket. Russian imports grew by almost 50% to 34.3 million barrels, representing nearly 44% of India's imports in the first half of March, as smaller suppliers from Africa like Congo (1.9 million barrels), Gabon (1.7 million barrels) and Sudan (0.7 million barrels) joined India's sourcing mix. Consequently, India's crude stocks fell by some 15% from the beginning of the US-Iran conflict and the closure of the Hormuz Strait, as the refiners chose to reduce stocks in their pipelines and refinery tanks to keep processing rates steady. This strategy would maintain short-term supply but would compromise buffer capability and increase medium-term vulnerability (Iqbal & Ikram, 2026).

The current situation has revealed the vulnerabilities in India's oil logistics system. The risk exposure is highly concentrated since India has to depend on only 6 countries for fulfilling its need for crude oil, which comes largely from Russia and the Key West Asian countries and accounts for more than 85%. Transit times were high for Russian and African crude, and the closure of the Hormuz channel further reduced supply. The strategic stock reserves of India are expected to meet the net crude oil imports for 9-10 days, while the refinery stocks can meet the crude requirements for another 64 days. This is significantly less when compared with the number of days that Japan and South Korea have their reserves covered, which are about 200 days and 207 days respectively. Thus, import shock absorbers of India are poor. Many of the crude oil and LPG imports are still reliant on the Gulf shipping channels that pass through the waters of Hormuz, and the current situation continues to make the rest of the world appreciate the speed at which suspension of insurance, tankers being anchored, and shipping withdrawals could block this access to India. According to the S&P Global study, there is the issue of “the deeper vulnerability of the Indian energy eco-system”: while the energy security in the country has always been seen as an import issue. A country's reliance on suppliers from the Gulf region is identified as a major concern with few short-term options available to LPG (Tantray, 2026).

On the pricing side, the same inflationary factors have been at play in India as elsewhere high crude benchmarks, freight and war risk premiums with the domestic price side attempting to act as a buffer. Despite this, the Hormuz shock had led to sharp rise in international pricing of crude goods as well as refined products, but Indian government has capped rises in petrol, diesel, and LPG prices through various policy buffers, supplier changes, and losses by the state run oil marketing companies. India's refiners were also spared of the price shock during the crisis as China simultaneously cut its crude imports, thereby reducing the impact on the region's prices. There are fiscal and corporate costs associated with this stabilization, though. As domestic prices remain low compared to the cost of imports and refining, state owned companies end up with under recoveries, and the government is under pressure either by making subsidy commitments or providing implicit support. Even if wholesale prices move more slowly than retail prices, analysts and think tanks caution India is far from protected from continued volatility, with concentrated import exposure, shallow strategic reserves and the configuration of oil refineries geared towards specific grades of crude all leading to increased macro-economic risk (Bhattarai, 2026). The impact of this Hormuz crisis on India has placed India in a vulnerable position with regard to energy security.

There has been a marked change in import quantities and sources, reduction in inventory levels and cover levels, an increase in route and concentration risk, and a rise in price fluctuations, to some extent even within the country, at the fiscal and strategic level. With respect to India, the disruption of the maritime choke point is not only a challenge from a geopolitical standpoint but directly reflects the extent of dependence of India on crude oil imports and energy supply chains (Omidi & Noolkar-Oak, 2022).

India's Strategic Response to the West Asia Crisis

The Indian response to the current West Asian tensions and the Hormuz crisis has been unambiguously driven by the goal of protecting its energy security and it is possible to identify this over three strands, diplomatic, strategic and economic, with clear names, numbers and policy actions. New Delhi has accorded energy security a high priority in its approach to the West Asian region diplomatically (Gurjar, 2023). The Indian government remained in contact with all key players including all the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, the US and Israel, and added that the country's key concern was to ensure energy security and "safe and unimpeded transit" of energy and goods through the region on 13 March 2026. India has specifically requested for avoiding attacks on civilian infrastructure including energy infrastructure, as India is a significant importer and thus facing vulnerabilities in the conflict dynamics (Singh, 2015). During the crisis, PM Modi had telephonic conversations with at least five leaders concerned about Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and key extra regional partners, for de-escalation, and to ensure the stability of shipping lanes and energy flows. The evaluation of India's foreign policy towards West Asia characterizes this as 'multi alignment diplomacy' as India maintains its ties with Iran and Israel with the aim of ensuring supply security and political space to maneuver between conflict and sanctions with its ties to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar (Omidi & Noolkar-Oak, 2022).

India has been doing so both diplomatically and practically, with a strategic approach which has been a mix of crisis diplomacy and action to make arrangements for contingencies. The government has been keeping a close watch on shipping routes both in the Gulf and internationally and has been in touch with various ministries to monitor tanker movements and choke points, official briefings have said. India's overall naval posture in the Arabian Sea and approaches to Hormuz have been dovetailed with this monitoring, though the details of these operations are not fully public, and the strategic objective is to ensure the safe passage of Indian flagged or India chartered vessels and be ready to provide convoy or escort arrangements if required. Mean, missions in West Asia have stepped up their outreach to the large Indian expatriate community, providing guidance and contingency plans for evacuation, based on prior missions in Yemen and other strife-torn regions. These strategic shifts place energy security on a broader platform. India's naval presence and crisis management capability is now legitimized not just as a means to exert influence in the region, but to safeguard "critical shipping lanes" and "energy lifelines" (Tantray, 2026).

In the economic and energy policy field, India has taken concrete steps to minimize exposure and enhance resilience, through quantifiable objectives. In his address to the Lok Sabha on the West Asia conflict, Prime Minister Modi said India became an importer of energy from 27 countries a decade ago but is now importing from 41 countries by early 2026 as a clear diversification strategy to "reduce vulnerability to global disruptions." This diversification has also been matched by the increase in strategic petroleum reserves too. Modi noted that India has now more than 5.3 million tons (53 lakh metric tons) of SPR, with plans to increase this to over 6.4 million tons (64 lakh metric tons). An inter ministerial briefing noted that by the end of 2025, "70% of India's crude imports" were transiting through alternate routes and suppliers, reducing direct chokepoint exposure, as a structural shift toward re-routing supplies (Bhattarai, 2026).

In India, these structural changes have been coupled with price and supply management. Modi pointed out that the country's LPG supply was being scaled up and efforts were being made to keep petrol and diesel supplies uninterrupted across the country. The cause of the crisis is attributed as India's retail fuel prices were not allowed to move as much as other benchmarks, suggesting state-run oil marketing companies have taken some of the pain in the form of under recoveries, and the government has responded to volatility by making calibrated tax and excise adjustments. In July 2026, Modi asserted that India had "successfully mitigated the energy crisis caused by the conflict in West Asia" in public statements, citing sources like diversified imports, robust energy reserves, and judicious pricing

policies. Policy analyses also have noted India's push during the crisis for refineries to process more grades of crude oil and to revitalize overland or non-Hormuz maritime pipelines and routes to LNG suppliers. Diplomatically, India has played all sides, and actively sought to ensure unhindered energy transit. Strategically, it has linked naval posture and protection of the diaspora to the protection of shipping lanes. Economically, it has broadened its supplier base from 27 countries to 41, raised the level of its SPR from 2.8 million tons to more than 5.3 million tons, and rerouted around 70 percent of crude imports away from the Hormuz straits keeping domestic fuel prices under control. The measures are a gradual but data-backed step to shift the energy mix from India's traditionally vulnerable and import reliant towards a more diversified and resilient one, amid the ongoing geopolitical tensions in West Asia. (Tariq, Ali & Kiran, 2025)

On March 10th, the Government used the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to make the Natural Gas (Supply Regulation) Order, 2026. The Order set up a priority allocation scheme for natural gas supplies (Chowdhary & Usmani, 2026). Domestic piped natural gas, transport compressed natural gas, and LPG production was given the highest priority and was fully supplied. Fertilizer plants received 70% of their usual supply and manufacturing industries linked to the national gas grid were only allotted 80% of their normal supply. For industrial and commercial city gas distribution consumers, this was limited to 80% of their normal supply. The minimum waiting period for domestic LPG cylinder refills to discourage panic buying and hoarding has been raised from 21 days to 25 days. The war has furthered India's push to diversify its energy imports from the Gulf region. Russian Urals crude went from trading at a discount to trading at a premium since demand for supplies that avoid the Strait of Hormuz grew (Patel, 2026). India also inked a Strategic Energy Partnership with Canada, which also involves a $2.6 billion uranium supply deal with Cameco. Talks are on to ink India's first long term LPG procurement deal with Canada. Australia has pledged further natural gas deliveries to replace almost 60 million metric standard cubic meters per day of gas India typically imports from Qatar. These measures are part of India's efforts to diversify from traditional sources of energy from the Gulf and make its energy supply chain more robust (Pradhan, 2019). The conflict has also brought about significant maritime security issues. In the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, there are reportedly more than 38 Indian-flagged vessels stranded and almost 20,000 Indian seafarers in the conflict zone. Energy transport security is thus a critical issue for the Ministry of Defence. The Indian Navy has been asked to be on duty to provide escort to LPG and crude oil carrying merchant ships in the high risk waters in connection with Operation Sankalp (Anonymous, 2026). The full-scale naval deployment decision will be made by mid-March, after a number of private insurance company's suspended coverage for ships sailing in the area. In the wake of the attack on the 'Skylight' tanker which claimed two lives of Indian crew members on March 1, there was urgent need to improve maritime security (Rettig & Rubinovitz, 2025). The war has brought about some significant weaknesses in the energy security structure of India. Oversupply and reliance on few suppliers in the Gulf, as well as the danger of relying on the Strait of Hormuz for energy transportation, were among the areas lacking here have been revealed during the crisis. The government has responded through domestic LPG production, demand management, reallocating LPG supplies and diversification of import sources, in the immediate term. In the medium and long term, India should develop strategic LPG stocks, build of a naval energy convoy force to protect energy supplies, expand long term supply contracts with partners outside the Gulf region, and diversify its sources of key energy imports in order to decrease its reliance on a single region for energy supplies (Shah et al., 2026).

Major reflections

1. **Disputes Among Nations Can Impact Global Markets:** The Israel-Iran dispute and Hormuz crises have been used as an example for showing that regional conflicts can create disruptions in the global market for oil and natural gas.
2. **Diversification Becomes Essential in Energy Security:** Initiatives by India to deal with such crisis situations, including the efforts to look for alternative sources of oil and gas along with alternate routes for transportation, prove the necessity of diversification in the issue of energy security.
3. **Maritime Security as a Foundation for Energy Security in Supply Chain:** Given the crisis that has occurred, it is important to highlight the significance of strong maritime and naval forces in the protection of the supply chain that transports oil and LNG to India.

4. **Economic and Social Implications of Disrupted Supply Chain:** There are various economic implications of a disrupted supply chain for oil and natural gas, and it impacts the prices, results in inflation, and impacts various economic sectors such as agriculture, industry, hospitality, and domestic consumers.
5. **Diplomacy Is a Crucial Aspect of Protection of Energy Interests:** The Indian diplomatic strategy in dealing with countries such as the Gulf nations, Iran, and other countries in the region clearly reflects the significance of diplomacy in protecting energy interests.
6. **Shift to Renewable Energy Source as a Strategic Resilience Approach:** Crisis speeds up India's movement towards renewable energy source and electrification as the approach to create an energy future that is secure, diversified, and sustainable that will depend less on geopolitically sensitive oil supply routes.
7. **Making Domestic Policy Measures to Absorb Exogenous Shock:** Application of Essential Commodities Act, strategic petroleum reserves and demand management strategies reflect the importance of making domestic policies to guard against external shocks.
8. **Diversification of Supply Chain Cannot Be Avoided:** The heavy reliance of the country on limited number of supplier countries and route through the Hormuz makes it clear that diversification of the suppliers and supply chain cannot be delayed anymore.
9. **Geopolitical Strategy for Long Term Needs to Be Made:** Energy security issue in the area of conflict requires long term strategy, which includes military preparation, diplomacy, diversification and investments in sustainable energy sources.

Contribution of the study

Contribution of the Study

The contribution of the study lies in the comprehensive and evidence-based examination of the influence of the Israeli-Iranian conflict as well as the Hormuz crisis on India's energy security because of the disturbance of the oil and gas supply chains and price fluctuations. The study is unique in that it employs geopolitical, maritime, and economic perspectives when discussing India's vulnerabilities, including dependence on the Gulf supplies through the Hormuz Strait, as well as the measures taken (or to be taken) by India in response to those vulnerabilities. The detailed understanding provided by this study guides the energy policy makers in the need for long term diversification and energy resilience strategies to mitigates future geopolitical shocks, which would otherwise be absent from the existing literature, as it connects regional conflicts directly with dynamics of India's energy security in this context.

Limitations of the research

The limitations of the research include the use of qualitative methods of research, as well as secondary data from government documents, international resources and academic sources that cannot provide up-to-date information on current geopolitical changes and changes in energy markets. Also, this research mainly pays attention to vulnerabilities and approaches to address them in India, without considering any quantitative modeling and empirical studies to obtain more precise estimates on the effectiveness. Besides, considering the quickly changing situation in West Asia, the findings of the research can be valid for a certain period of time, because geopolitical situation and changes in energy markets can change fast. Lastly, the research is focused more on policy-related problems rather than operational issues of certain actors.

CONCLUSION

The geopolitical developments surrounding the Israel-Iran conflict and the crisis at the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted India's significant vulnerabilities in ensuring energy security amidst regional instability. As a nation heavily reliant on Gulf region imports particularly crude oil, LPG, and LNG India's dependence on the Strait of Hormuz as a critical maritime chokepoint poses substantial risks to its energy supply chain, economic stability, and national security. The disruption of shipping routes, soaring energy prices, and logistical challenges has underscored the fragility of India's energy infrastructure and the urgent need for structural reforms. India has chosen a multi-dimensional approach, which includes diversification of imports from other nations than those of the Gulf region, stockpiling of strategic crude oil and gas supplies, improving international relations with other nations both in and out of its immediate geographical vicinity, and stepping up production capabilities of domestic energy resources. This approach seeks to mitigate the risks of being heavily dependent on sensitive areas and supply lines. However, for sustained energy

security, India will have to keep diversifying its energy sources, establish reliable alternative sources of supply, build on its own energy reserves, and build up its maritime defensive capabilities. Incorporating renewable energy sources into the national grid and formulating long-term energy policies which would mitigate any geopolitical threats will be very important. Essentially, securing the energy future of India will require a strategic approach that encompasses all diplomatic, technological, and infrastructural efforts in equal measure. Through such efforts alone, India is able to overcome any challenges from regional conflicts and secure its energy future.

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