Oil Wealth and Unequal Development: Elite Capture, Governance and Social Exclusion in Angola and Nigeria
Rukmani
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Sharda School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sharda University Greater Noida, India
Jozsinar Faustino Pemba
Research Associate, Conectando Sociedade de Prestadora de serviços de pagamentos, LDA, PayPay Africa.
This comparative study examines how oil wealth in Angola and Nigeria shapes uneven development, focusing on elite capture, governance quality, and social exclusion. Both countries are major African oil producers with colonial legacies oriented towards resource extraction and significant oil-dependent fiscal revenues. However, Angola’s centralized political system contrasts with Nigeria’s federal and more competitive political structure, resulting in different patterns of elite rent-seeking and distribution. The analysis demonstrates that oil wealth alone does not guarantee inclusive development; rather, its impact depends on institutional governance and political incentives controlling resource rents. In Angola, elite capture is concentrated within a centralized regime (MPLA), which enabled state-led infrastructure rebuilding but failed to translate oil revenues into broad human capital improvements, evidenced by a low Human Capital Index (0.36) and high inequality (Gini =51). Nigeria exhibits fragmented elite capture due to federalism and regional competition, leading to spatial inequalities, especially in oil-producing areas like the Niger Delta, despite moderate national inequality measures. Public expenditures often favor politically visible projects over inclusive social services. Governance quality acts as a mediating factor, affecting how resource rents convert into development outcomes. The study underscores that diversification, transparency, local participation, and accountable institutions are critical to transforming oil wealth into sustainable economic and social capabilities, rather than perpetuating elite enrichment and exclusion.
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